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For decades, bankruptcy reform has been controversial. Believing 
that gaps in the then-existing bankruptcy laws provided the means by 
which the bankruptcy system was being exploited1 and thus, the 
impetus for at least some of the dissention, Congress enacted the 
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act 
(BAPCPA).2 However, rather than improve matters, the legislation 
arguably resulted in even more controversy. And though the 
consequences of this legislation were not limited to any one form of 
bankruptcy filing,3 an intense debate ensued with respect to a 
                                                 
* J.D. candidate, May 2008, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology; Tulane University, M.P.H., May 2003; University of Arkansas, B.S., 
May 1999. 
1 See H.R. REP. No. 109-31, pt. 1 (2005). 
2 Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (codified in part as 11 U.S.C. § 1325 (2005)). 
3 Brett Weiss, “Not Dead Yet:” Bankruptcy After BAPCPA, MD. B.J., May-
June 2007, at 17, 18-20. For example, enactment of the BAPCPA resulted in, inter 
alia, mandatory credit counseling for Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 filers, required 
means testing to determine eligibility for Chapter 7, and refiling restrictions for 
Chapter 7 debtors. Id. 
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provision of the BAPCPA affecting Chapter 13 proceedings 
exclusively.4 Specifically, the dispute centered around the “hanging 
paragraph”—the unnumbered paragraph following § 1325(a)(9).5  
The Seventh Circuit, in In re Wright, became the first court of 
appeals to interpret the hanging paragraph.6 The decision in this case 
limits the conditions under which a bankruptcy court shall confirm the 
Chapter 13 repayment plan of a 910 debtor.7 It did so by holding the 
debtor accountable for its original contractual obligations, where the 
debtor proposed in its repayment plan, to surrender its 910 vehicle to 
the 910 creditor.8 
In In re Wright, at the time that the 910 debtors proposed their 
Chapter 13 repayment plan, they owed more on the loan for their 
vehicle than the vehicle was worth.9 Despite the difference between 
the loan’s balance and the market value of the vehicle, the debtors 
proposed a Chapter 13 repayment plan whereby they would surrender 
their vehicle to the 910 creditor in full satisfaction of the debt.10 The 
issue on appeal was whether the BAPCPA allowed the debtors to 
surrender their vehicle in complete satisfaction of their debt 
obligations or, alternatively, if the creditor was entitled to an unsecured 
                                                 
4 See In re Graupner, 356 B.R. 907, 911 (Bankr. D. Ga. 2006).  
5 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(9). The “hanging paragraph” is so named, as it “has no 
alphanumeric designation and merely dangles at the end of § 1325(a).” Dianne C. 
Kems, Cram-a-lot: The Quest Continues, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Nov. 2005, at 10. 
6 492 F.3d 829 (7th Cir. 2007).  
7 See id. at 833.  
8 Id. A “910 creditor” is a creditor who possesses a purchase money security 
interest (PMSI) in a vehicle acquired by a Chapter 13 debtor for the debtor’s 
personal use during the 910 days prior to the debtor’s filing of a Chapter 13 
bankruptcy petition. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a). Similarly, the vehicle is referred to as 
a “910 vehicle;” the debtor, a “910 debtor.” See id. Because the Bankruptcy Code 
does not provide a definition of the term “purchase money security interest,” courts 
interpreting it have looked to state law. In re Stevens, 368 B.R. 5, 8 (Bankr. D. Neb. 
2007) (citing In re Price, 363 B.R. 734 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2007)). Generally, a 
“purchase money security interest” is defined as a security interest created when a 
buyer uses the lender’s money to make the purchase and immediately gives the 
lender security. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1127 (8th ed. 2005). 
9 In re Wright, 492 F.3d at 831.  
10 Id.  
2
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claim in the amount of the difference that remained on the loan after 
surrender.11 In affirming the decision of the bankruptcy court and 
thereby adopting the minority view among bankruptcy courts, the 
Seventh Circuit held that while the BAPCPA prohibits the application 
of § 50612 to the claim of a 910 creditor, in the absence of § 506 the 
debtor is left with its original, contractual responsibilities.13 The 
Seventh Circuit looked to Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code 
(“U.C.C.”) and to the parties’ contract and concluded that upon the 
debtors’ surrender of their vehicle, the creditor was “entitled to an 
(unsecured) deficiency judgment for the difference between the value 
of the collateral and the balance on the loan.”14 
Section I of this note outlines the relevant bankruptcy law, 
including the BAPCPA. Section II discusses the differing views 
between the bankruptcy courts. Section III analyzes the Seventh 
Circuit’s recent opinion in In re Wright. Section IV discusses why the 
Seventh Circuit’s holding in In re Wright, that in the absence of § 506 
the parties are left with their original contractual agreements, was 
correct. Section V concludes that in adopting the minority view among 
bankruptcy courts, the Seventh Circuit chose the proper interpretation 
of the hanging paragraph. 
 
I. THE BANKRUPTCY CODE 
 
In a time when consumers are bombarded with unsolicited offers 
for credit, it is not surprising that they may sometimes find themselves 
overextended and unable to meet their resulting payment obligations.15 
Congress—by way of the Bankruptcy Code—attempted to provide 
                                                 
11 Id. at 830-31. 
12 11 U.S.C. § 506 (2006). 
13 In re Wright, 492 F.3d at 832-33. 
14 Id. at 833. 
15 See Julie L. Williams, Acting Comptroller of the Currency, Speech before 
the American Bankers Association on Credit Underwriting Standards (Sept. 27, 
1998), in O.C.C. Q.J., Dec. 1998, at 108.  
3
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relief to strained debtors in the form of a Chapter 7, Chapter 11, or 
Chapter 13 bankruptcy filing.16 
Chapter 13 is “a form of bankruptcy relief where the debtor 
commits to repay a portion or all of his debts in exchange for receiving 
a broad discharge of debt.”17 As such, a Chapter 13 filing is often used 
by debtors who are “on the way up” as a result of an improved 
financial situation.18 In a Chapter 13 bankruptcy filing, a debtor is 
required to prepare a plan of repayment that must be confirmed by the 
bankruptcy court.19 Pursuant to § 1325(a)(5),20 the court “shall 
confirm” the plan if the debtor addresses its secured debt in one of 
three ways.21 First, the creditor may agree to the debtor’s proposed 
treatment of the creditor’s claim.22 Second, the debtor may keep the 
collateral by allowing the creditor to retain the lien on the collateral 
until the debtor has made payments totaling the amount of the 
creditor’s claim.23 Finally, the debtor may surrender the collateral to 
the creditor.24 It is in the context of the last alternative that the 
                                                 
16 See FCC v. NextWave Pers. Comm’ns Inc., 537 U.S. 293, 305 (2003). While 
the elements of these proceedings differ, the scope of this article is limited to 
bankruptcy filings made pursuant to Chapter 13. 
17 H.R. REP. No. 109-31, pt. 1 (2005). 
18 Henry E. Hildebrand III, Unintended Consequences: BAPCPA and the New 
Disposable Income Test, AM. BANKR. INST. J., May 2006, at 14.  
19 11 U.S.C. § 1325. 
20 11 U.S.C. §1325(a)(5). 
21 Id. The pertinent part of the statute states the options for plan confirmation:  
(A) the holder of [the secured] claim has accepted the plan; 
(B) (i) the plan provides that—(I) the holder of [the secured] 
claim retain the lien securing such claim until . . . (aa) the 
payment of the underlying debt . . . and (ii) the value, as of the 
effective date of the plan, of property to be distributed under 
the plan on account of such claim is not less than the allowed 
amount of such claim; or . . . (C) the debtor surrenders the 
property securing such claim to such holder.  
Id. 
22 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(A).  
23 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B). Courts have termed this process “cramdown.” In 
re Wright, 492 F.3d 829, 830 (7th Cir. 2007).  
24 11 U.S.C. § 1325 (a)(5)(C). 
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BAPCPA has created great discord among the bankruptcy courts.25 
Namely, courts have had to address the effect of the newly added 
hanging paragraph in this situation and answer the question of 
whether, upon the debtor’s surrender of the vehicle, the 910 creditor 
possesses an unsecured claim equal to the amount of any deficiency or 




Prior to the enactment of the BAPCPA, a Chapter 13 debtor was 
given three options for the disposition of the collateral—convince the 
creditor to accept the plan, keep the collateral and make payments 
totaling the value of the collateral, or surrender the collateral to the 
creditor. Further, in the simple—or at least simpler—pre-BAPCPA 
times, the claims of all Chapter 13 secured creditors were treated 
equally.27 The claims of a 910 creditor and any other Chapter 13 
secured creditor were subject to § 506, which provides that:  
 
(1) [a]n allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on 
property in which the estate has an interest, or that is 
subject to setoff under section 553 of this title, is a secured 
claim to the extent of the value of such creditor’s interest in 
the estate’s interest in such property, or to the extent of the 
amount subject to setoff, as the case may be, and is an 
unsecured claim to the extent that the value of such 
creditor’s interest or the amount so subject to set off is less 
than the amount of such allowed claim. Such value shall be 
determined in light of the purpose of the valuation and of 
the proposed disposition or use of such property, and in 
                                                 
25 See In re Graupner, 356 B.R. 907, 911 (Bankr. D. Ga. 2006). 
26 See In re Pinti, 363 B.R. 369 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007); In re Ezell, 338 B.R. 
330 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2006); In re Particka, 355 B.R. 616 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 
2006); In re Zehrung, 351 B.R. 675 (W.D. Wis. 2006).  
27 See id. at 334-35. 
5
Jones: Who’s Left Suspended on the Line?: The Ominous Hanging Paragraph
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2007
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                           Volume 3, Issue 1                           Fall 2007 
6 
conjunction with any hearing on such disposition or use or 
on a plan affecting such creditor’s interest.28 
 
Thus, the claims of all Chapter 13 secured creditors were subject 
to bifurcation.29 As such, a Chapter 13 secured creditor, including a 
910 creditor, was entitled to a secured claim in the amount of the value 
of the collateral.30 Where the creditor’s claim exceeded this amount, 
the creditor was entitled to an unsecured claim for the deficiency.31 
Accordingly, the unsecured claim was treated identically to that of the 





Although bankruptcy law has seen its fair share of changes, no 
amendment since the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 197833 has been as 
comprehensive as the BAPCPA.34 Referred to as the “new bankruptcy 
law”35, the BAPCPA was enacted in response to several factors36 that 
Congress believed necessitated extensive reform of the Bankruptcy 
                                                 
28 11 U.S.C. § 506 (2006); see In re Ezell, 338 B.R. at 338. 
29 See In re Ezell, 338 B.R. at 338-40.  
30 Id.  
31 Id. at 338-40. 
32 See id. 
33 Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 254 (1978). 
34 151 CONG. REC. H1993-01, at H2047-48 (daily ed. Apr. 14, 2005) (statement 
of Rep. Sensenbrenner) (“This legislation represents the most comprehensive 
reforms of the bankruptcy system in more than 25 years.”). 
35 E.g. The Law Offices of John T. Orcutt, Website Home Page, 
http://www.billsbills.com (last visited Nov. 28, 2007). 
36 These factors include: the determination that the increase in bankruptcy 
filings was not temporary but rather part of a consistent upward trend, the substantial 
losses that resulted from bankruptcy filings, loopholes that allowed abuse of the 
bankruptcy system, and findings that some bankruptcy debtors were able to repay 
much of their debt. H.R. REP. No. 109-31, pt. 1 (2005). 
6
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Code.37 The most notable change effectuated by the BAPCPA was to 
Chapter 13 bankruptcy filings—namely, the BAPCPA’s hanging 
paragraph and its resulting effect on the claims of a 910 creditor.38  
While the BAPCPA changed certain provisions, others, such as 
§§ 1325(a)(5)(A)39 and (C),40 were left unchanged and 
§ 1325(a)(5)(B)41 was modified largely to include more detailed terms 
and specific requirements relating to the section.42 Consequently, 
following the enactment of the BAPCPA, the debtor still had the same 
three options for the disposition of the collateral—acceptance by the 
creditor, retention of the collateral, or surrender of the collateral.43 
However, the enactment of the BAPCPA added the hanging paragraph 
to § 1325.44 This provision provides that: 
 
[f]or purposes of paragraph (5),45 section 506 shall not 
apply to a claim described in that paragraph if the creditor 
has a purchase money security interest securing the debt 
that is the subject of the claim, the debt was incurred within 
the 910-day preceding the date of the filing of the petition, 
and the collateral for that debt consists of a motor vehicle 
(as defined in section 30102 of title 49) acquired for the 
personal use of the debtor, or46 if collateral for that debt 
                                                 
37 See generally Joseph Satorius, Note, Strike or Dismiss: Interpretation of the 
BAPCPA 109(h) Credit Counseling Requirement, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2231, 2237 
(2007).  
38 In re Morales, 359 B.R. 211, 215 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2007). 
39 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(A) (2006). 
40 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(C).  
41 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B). 
42 In re Particka, 355 B.R. 616, 618 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2006).  
43 Id. 
44 Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (codified in part as 11 U.S.C. § 1325). 
45 This referenced paragraph is 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5) which provides the 
debtor with three methods by which to have a Chapter 13 repayment plan confirmed. 
See supra Part IB.  
46 As this second situation to which the BAPCPA applies is beyond the scope 
of this article, it will not be discussed further.  
7
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consists of any other thing of value, if the debt was incurred 
during the 1-year period preceding that filing.47  
 
As a result of the addition of the hanging paragraph, the claims of 
all Chapter 13 secured creditors are no longer treated the same.48 
Rather, the hanging paragraph distinguishes between the claims of 910 
creditors and those of other Chapter 13 secured creditors.49 In so 
doing, the BAPCPA prohibits the application of § 506 and, thus, 
bifurcation of the claims of 910 creditors.50 Although the statute 
prohibits bifurcation of the claim regardless of the debtor’s proposed 
disposition of the vehicle,51 this prohibition leads to two very different 
results depending on whether the debtor retains or surrenders the 
vehicle.52 
In the instance where the debtor proposes to retain the 910 
vehicle, it is true that bifurcation is forbidden—but this is irrelevant, as 
the debtor must agree to pay the 910 creditor the full value of the 
creditor’s claim.53 In this scenario, the law is well-settled.54 However, 
appropriate application of the law is less clear in the frequent scenario 
where the debtor intends to surrender the vehicle to the 910 creditor.55  
                                                 
47 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a) (2006). 
48 See In re Ezell, 338 B.R. 330, 338 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2006).  
49 11 U.S.C. § 1325 (2006); In re Ezell, 338 B.R. at 340. 
50 11 U.S.C. § 1325. 
51 Id. 
52 See In re Zehrung, 351 B.R. 675, 678 (W.D. Wis. 2006). 
53 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B). 
54 See generally In re Shaw, 341 B.R. 543 (Bankr. M.D. N.C. 2006); In re 
Turner, 349 B.R. 431 (Bankr. D. S.C. 2006); In re White, 352 B.R. 633 (Bankr. E.D. 
La. 2006); In re Solis, 356 B.R. 398 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2006). In this scenario, the 
debtor must pay the full amount of the claim even if the vehicle is worth less than the 
claim.  
55 Compare In re Pinti, 363 B.R. 369, 369 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007) (holding 
that a 910 creditor is not entitled to an unsecured claim for the amount of the 
deficiency), and In re Ezell, 338 B.R. 330, 330 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2006) (910 
creditor’s claim is fully satisfied upon surrender despite deficiency), with In re 
Particka, 355 B.R. 616, 616 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2006) (910 creditor entitled to an 
unsecured claim in the amount of the deficiency), and In re Zehrung, 351 B.R. at 
675 (creditor allowed to assert an unsecured claim for the amount of the deficiency).  
8
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Suppose the debtor’s 910 vehicle was valued at $12,000 and the 
creditor filed a claim in the amount of $15,000, representing the 
amount owing on the loan. If the debtor keeps the vehicle—though the 
claim is not bifurcated into a secured and unsecured portion—the 
debtor must pay the creditor the full $15,000. This outcome is the 
same in all courts. However, the result is not as clear in the scenario 
where the debtor surrenders the vehicle. In courts adopting the 
majority view, the creditor would only receive $12,000, satisfied by 
the vehicle’s surrender. The debtor would not be responsible for the 
remaining $3,000 even if the parties’ contract so provided. Conversely, 
in courts subscribing to the minority view, the creditor would be 
entitled to the full $15,000. The surrender of the vehicle would satisfy 
$12,000 and the creditor would be allowed an unsecured claim for the 
remaining $3,000.56 
 
II. DISSENT THROUGHOUT THE BANKRUPTCY COURTS 
 
Because of the difficulties encountered when interpreting the 
hanging paragraph, two diverse series of opinions have emerged from 
the bankruptcy courts.57 “As of last count—by a margin of 3–1—the 
vast majority of reported cases favor the position . . . that the 910 
creditor can, through the confirmation of a proposed plan, be 
compelled to accept the surrender of its collateral in full satisfaction of 
its claims.”58 Not only is there conflict among the various circuits but 
conflicting opinions within circuits have also begun to emerge.59 
                                                 
56 A distinction must be made at this point. Although it is not likely that the 
holders of general unsecured claims would be paid the full amount of their claim, the 
holder of an unsecured claim is at least theoretically entitled to the full value of the 
claim. How much the creditor receives, however, depends on, inter alia, the 
bankruptcy estate’s value, the number and nature of the creditors, the amount of the 
claims, and the number of claims. 
57 In re Roth, No. 06-11330, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 1647, at *2 (N.D. Ind. May 4, 
2007), rev’d, No. 1:07-CV-135-TS, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80162 (N.D. Ind. Oct. 
25, 2007).  
58 Id.  
59 Compare In re Kenney, Nos. 06-71975-A, 07-70359-A, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 
1646 (Bankr. E.D. Va. May 11, 2007) (applying the majority position), with In re 
9
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Consequently, this article does not endeavor to categorize circuits 
based upon whether the circuit subscribes to the majority or the 
minority view of the issue. Rather, the article sets forth each opposing 
view and provides representative cases from the bankruptcy courts that 
have adhered to the particular position. While the varying views will 
be presented, the focus of this article is the Seventh Circuit’s decision 
in In re Wright, whereby the Seventh Circuit adopted the minority 
view that where there exists a deficiency after surrender, the creditor is 
entitled to an unsecured claim for that amount.60 
The importance of a consistent application of the hanging 
paragraph among all bankruptcy courts is apparent in light of the fact 
that this issue arises in a substantial number of consumer Chapter 13 
bankruptcy proceedings.61 Considering the rising costs of litigation, 
potential Chapter 13 debtors and 910 creditors alike would be well-
served by uniform treatment of the hanging paragraph.62  
 
A. The Majority’s Interpretation of the Hanging Paragraph 
 
A large number of courts adopting the majority interpretation 
maintain the view that the language of the hanging paragraph is 
unambiguous.63 These courts reason that the hanging paragraph 
                                                                                                                   
Long, No. 06-10601, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 2423 (Bankr. W.D. N.C. Feb. 1, 2007) 
(applying the minority approach). 
60 492 F.3d 829, 833 (7th Cir. 2007). 
61 Id. at 831. 
62 Id.  
63 See In re Pinti, 363 B.R. 369, 376 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007); In re Wampler, 
345 B.R. 730, 740 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2006); In re Curtis, 345 B.R. 756, 760 (Bankr. D. 
Utah 2006); In re Ezell, 338 B.R. 330, 341 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2006); In re Osborn, 
348 B.R. 500, 504 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2006); In re Quick, 360 B.R. 722, 728 (Bankr. 
N.D. Okla. 2007); In re Steakley, 769, 770 n.1 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2007); In re 
Bivins, No. 06-51778 RFH, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 519, at *8 (Bankr. D. Ga. Feb. 23, 
2007); In re Feddersen, 355 B.R. 738, 741 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 2006); In re Pool, 351 
B.R. 747, 752 (Bankr. D. Or. 2006); In re Nicely, 349 B.R. 600, 604 (Bankr. W.D. 
Mo. 2006); In re Payne, 347 B.R. 278, 282 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2006); In re Long, No. 
06-30651, 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 1605, at *30 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. July 12, 2006). 
Similarly, a number of courts subscribing to the minority view have also found the 
statute to be unambiguous. See In re Morales, 359 B.R. 211, 215 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 
10
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explicitly states its applicability to a 910 claim and expressly prohibits 
bifurcation of the claim.64 Arguing that the invocation of § 506 is the 
sole means of bifurcating a creditor’s claim, the courts assert that in 
the absence of § 506, a 910 creditor is not allowed to bifurcate its 
claim.65  
The bankruptcy court in In re Pinti acknowledged that the 
hanging paragraph was “poorly drafted” but found the language of the 
statute to be unambiguous.66 Though the In re Pinti court recognized 
that state law controls the creation and perfection of a lien, the court 
held this to be the extent of state law’s authority with respect to the 
lien and any claim that may arise in relation to it once the debtor has 
entered into bankruptcy.67 After the filing of the debtor’s bankruptcy 
petition, the “Bankruptcy Code, and not state law, determines whether 
and to what extent such claim should be allowed in the bankruptcy 
estate.”68 The court asserted that § 506 was the “starting point” in 
making this determination.69 Because the court maintained that the 
hanging paragraph prohibits application of this provision to claims by 
910 creditors, the court held that the creditor was not entitled to an 
unsecured claim for the deficiency.70 Additionally, the court noted that 
its holding would remain unchanged regardless of whether the debtor 





                                                                                                                   
2007); In re Hoffman, 359 B.R. 163, 166 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2006); In re Particka, 
355 B.R. 616, 625 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2006). 
64 See In re Pinti, 363 B.R. at 376; In re Wampler, 345 B.R. at 736; In re Quick, 
360 B.R. at 722; In re Payne, 347 B.R. at 278.  
65 See supra note 64. 
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B. The Minority’s Position of the Applicability of the Hanging 
Paragraph 
 
A minority of bankruptcy courts hold that a 910 creditor may 
assert an unsecured claim for any amount remaining after the debtor’s 
surrender of the 910 vehicle.72 Although these courts reach the same 
end result, they utilize different arguments to arrive at the conclusion. 
Some courts, such as the Seventh Circuit in In re Wright, maintain that 
with § 506 gone, both the debtor and creditor are left with their 
contractual rights and obligations, as defined by state law.73 According 
to the courts that adopt this reasoning, where the contract and/or the 
appropriate UCC provision of the state provides for a deficiency, the 
910 creditor is entitled to assert an unsecured deficiency claim for that 
amount.74 Because of this entitlement, the 910 creditor may not be 
forced to accept the vehicle in full satisfaction of the creditor’s 
claim.75 Other courts maintain that where the debtor surrenders the 
910 vehicle, it passes out of the bankruptcy estate and is no longer 
confined by the strictures of § 506.76 In these courts, because the 
bankruptcy law does not apply, the parties are left to their original 
contractual obligations. Still other courts assert that the language of 
the statute is ambiguous.77 Finding that the legislative history 
demonstrates Congress’s intent that the BAPCPA provide greater 
protection to 910 creditors, these courts hold that the creditor is 
entitled to assert an unsecured claim for any deficiency. 
 
 
                                                 
72 See, e.g., In re Morales, 359 B.R. 211, 217 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2007); In re 
Particka, 355 B.R. 616, 629 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2006); In re Zehrung, 351 B.R. 675, 
678 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 2006); In re Duke, 345 B.R. 806, 809 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 
2006).  
73 492 F.3d 829 (7th Cir. 2007). 
74 Id. 
75 See sources cited supra note 72. 
76 See, e.g., In re Zehrung, 351 B.R. at 678. 
77 See, e.g., id. at 678. 
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1. Upon Its Surrender, the 910 Vehicle is No Longer Part of the 
Estate78 
 
The bankruptcy court in In re Zehrung recognized that the 
BAPCPA prohibits the use of § 506 for the claims of 910 creditors but 
found that this was not the relevant provision of the bankruptcy code.79 
This provision applies only when the bankruptcy estate retains an 
interest in the 910 vehicle—an interest which “disappears with 
surrender.”80 The court found its interpretation of the hanging 
paragraph to be consistent not only with the statute’s language but also 
with Congress’s intent in enacting the legislation.81 The In re Zehrung 
court noted that the title of the section of the BAPCPA which added 
the hanging paragraph is “Section 306—Giving Secured Creditors Fair 
Treatment in Chapter 13 . . . Restoring the Foundation for Secured 
Credit.”82 Given Congress’s express objectives, the court found it 
improbable that the BAPCPA was intended to abrogate the rights of a 
910 creditor to an unsecured deficiency claim—a right that the 
creditors were entitled to prior to the enactment of the statute.83 The 
court further noted the result obtained under the majority’s approach—
the expansion of rights to the creditor where the debtor keeps the 
vehicle and the reduction of rights to the creditor where the collateral 
is surrendered.84 Consequently, the court held that the creditor was 






                                                 
78 See supra note 72.  
79 351 B.R. at 677-78. 
80 Id. 
81 Id.  
82 Id. 
83 Id. 
84 Id.  
85 Id. at 678. 
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2. The Hanging Paragraph is Ambiguous86 
 
Because the court in In re Duke found the language of the hanging 
paragraph to be ambiguous, it looked to the legislative history.87 While 
the court acknowledged that the history is limited, it discerned 
indicators that Congress, in passing the BAPCPA, sought to 
discourage bankruptcy abuse.88 Like the court in In re Pinti, the In re 
Duke court noted that the title of the section of the BAPCPA which 
added the hanging paragraph is, “Section 306—Giving Secured 
Creditors Fair Treatment in Chapter 13 . . . Restoring the Foundation 
for Secured Credit.”89 Therefore, the court reasoned that it was clear 
that Congress intended to provide secured creditors with greater 
protection.90 Forcing a creditor to accept surrender of the collateral in 
full satisfaction of its claim would eliminate the creditor’s deficiency 
claim and was therefore contrary to Congress’s purpose behind 
enacting the statute. Absent a clear indication that Congress intended 
this “anti-deficiency” result, the court held that upon surrender of the 
vehicle, the creditor was entitled to pursue the remedies available to it 
under state law.91 Namely, the creditor was entitled to an unsecured 
claim in the amount of the deficiency.92  
 
III. IN RE WRIGHT: THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT BECOMES THE FIRST COURT 
OF APPEALS TO ADDRESS THE ISSUE 
 
In In re Wright, the Seventh Circuit was asked to decide whether 
the hanging paragraph precluded a 910 creditor from asserting an 
unsecured claim for the amount of the balance that remained after the 
debtors’ surrender of the automobile.93 The debtors in In re Wright 
                                                 







93 In re Wright, 492 F.3d 829, 829 (7th Cir. 2007). 
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purchased a vehicle and, in so doing, entered into a contract where 
they agreed to be responsible for any deficiency in the event that the 
vehicle was seized and liquidated due to non-payment.94 Within 910 
days of the purchase, the debtors filed their bankruptcy petition.95 
They subsequently proposed a Chapter 13 repayment plan whereby 
they would surrender the vehicle to the creditor in full satisfaction of 
the loan.96 The debtors did not propose to pay any of the deficiency 
and as a result, the bankruptcy judge declined to confirm their Chapter 
13 plan.97 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(2)(A),98 the bankruptcy 
judge certified that the case satisfied subparagraphs (i) and (ii) of the 
statute.99 The Seventh Circuit accepted the bankruptcy court’s 
certification, noting that this issue arises in a large number of 
consumer cases but appears to be “stuck” in the bankruptcy courts.100 
The court affirmed the decision of the bankruptcy court and in doing 
                                                 
94 Id. at 830. 
95 Id. at 832. 
96 Id. at 831. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. The statute provides:  
The appropriate court of appeals shall have jurisdiction of 
appeals described in the first sentence of subsection (a) if the 
bankruptcy court, the district court, or the bankruptcy 
appellate panel involved, acting on its own motion or on the 
request of a party to the judgment, order, or decree described 
in such fist sentence, or all the appellants and appellees (if 
any) acting jointly, certify that – (i) the judgment, order or 
decree involves a question of law as to which there is no 
controlling decision of the court of appeals for the circuit or of 
the Supreme Court of the United States, or involves a matter 
of public importance; (ii) the judgment, order, or decree 
involves a question of law requiring resolution of conflicting 
decisions; or (iii) an immediate appeal from the judgment, 
order, or decree may materially advance the progress of the 
case or proceeding in which the appeal is taken; and if the 
court of appeals authorizes the direct appeal of the judgment, 
order, or decree.  
28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(2)(A) (2006). 
99 In re Wright, 492 F.3d at 831. 
100 Id. at 833. 
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so adopted the minority view among bankruptcy courts.101 The court 
agreed that the hanging paragraph eliminates the application of § 506 
to the claims at issue and thus the requirement that claims be 
bifurcated into secured and unsecured claims.102 However, the Seventh 
Circuit argued that § 506 is not “the only source of authority for a 
deficiency judgment when the collateral is insufficient.”103  
Judge Easterbrook considered the United State Supreme Court’s 
decision in Butner v. United States,104 and the court’s holding that 
when the Code does not provide a federal rule, state law determines 
rights and obligations.105 Because the hanging paragraph prohibits the 
application of § 506 to 910 claims post-BAPCPA, the debtors were left 
with their original contractual obligations and the 910 creditor was left 
with its rights specified in the contract.106 The contract that debtors 
entered into with the creditor provided that if the loan was not paid, 
the vehicle would be seized and sold.107 Further, the contract explicitly 
provided that upon seizure and liquidation of the automobile, the 
creditor would refund any surplus to the debtors.108 However, in the 
event that the vehicle was sold for less than the amount of the loan, the 
debtors “shall be liable for any deficiency.”109 This contract, Judge 
Easterbrook held, created a secured loan with recourse against the 
borrower.110 The contract further provided that the parties were 
entitled to all of their rights as specified in the U.C.C.111 The court 
then consulted 810 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-615(d),112 the applicable 
                                                 
101 Id. at 832. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. 
104 440 U.S. 48 (1979). 







112 The pertinent part of 810 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-615(d)(2) (2007) states that, 
“If the security interest under which a disposition is made secures payment or 
performance of an obligation, after making the payments and applications required 
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U.C.C. provision enacted by Illinois, and held that upon surrender of 
the automobile, the creditor was entitled to an unsecured claim for the 
difference between the car’s value and the balance of the loan.113 
Judge Easterbrook went on to pose a hypothetical in which debtors 
surrendered the automobile just one day prior to the filing of their 
Chapter 13 petition.114 The court reasoned, based upon the parties’ 
contract and the appropriate Illinois statute,115 that under those 
circumstances, the creditor would have been entitled to assert an 
unsecured claim for any amount by which the loan exceeded the value 
of the vehicle.116 The Seventh Circuit noted this anomalous 
outcome117—the creditor would have been allowed a deficiency the 
day before filing a bankruptcy petition but denied a deficiency just one 
day after filing.118 Not finding an operative provision in the Code to 
the contrary, Judge Easterbrook then looked to the title of the statute 
that enacted the hanging paragraph.119 Discerning what he believed to 
be Congress’s intent to provide protection for secured creditors, Judge 
Easterbrook reasoned that the hanging paragraph replaced a “contract-
defeating provision such as § 506” (which allows judges rather than 
the market to value the collateral and set an interest rate, and may 
prevent creditors from repossessing [the vehicle]) with the agreement 
freely negotiated between debtor and creditor.”120  
Judge Easterbrook also refuted the assertions of the National 
Association of Consumer Bankruptcy Attorneys, appearing as amicus 
curiae, that the hanging paragraph completely eliminates the 910 
                                                                                                                   
by subsection (a) and permitted by subsection (c) . . . the obligor is liable for any 
deficiency. 810 ILL. COMP. STAT 5/9-615(d)(2). 
113 In re Wright, 492 F.3d at 832. 
114 Id. 
115 810 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-615(d)(2). 
116 In re Wright, 492 F.3d at 832. 
117 Id. While other events are triggered the day after filing bankruptcy where 
they would not have been the day before bankruptcy, the court seemingly found this 
result inconsistent with Congress’s purpose in enacting the BAPCPA. See id. at 832. 
118 Id. 
119 Id.  
120 Id. 
17
Jones: Who’s Left Suspended on the Line?: The Ominous Hanging Paragraph
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2007
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                           Volume 3, Issue 1                           Fall 2007 
18 
creditor’s secured status.121 The reasoning of the amici was flawed, the 
court asserted, because it assumed that § 506 was the only source in 
bankruptcy of a secured creditor’s rights.122 These considerations led 
Judge Easterbrook to hold that while the debtors were not required to 
pay the unsecured debt in full any more than they were obligated to 
pay the full amount of their other unsecured debts, the creditor’s 
unsecured claim could not “be written off in toto while other 
unsecured creditors are paid some fraction of their entitlements.”123 In 
other words, Judge Easterbrook decided that the creditor was allowed 
at least the right to receive a portion of its unsecured claim—the same 
percentage that other creditors with unsecured claims were entitled.  
 
IV. The Seventh Circuit Made the Right Decision in In re Wright 
 
In In re Wright, the Seventh Circuit made an important decision: 
in cases where the value of the 910 vehicle is insufficient, § 506 does 
not provide the sole source of authority for a deficiency judgment.124 
This determination is not only consistent with the statute and state law 
but it is also in line with Congress’s purpose in enacting the BAPCPA.  
 
A. The Hanging Paragraph and State Law 
 
In Butner v. United States125 the Supreme Court, desiring uniform 
treatment of property interests in state and federal courts, held that,  
 
Property interests are created and defined by state law. 
Unless some federal interest requires a different result, there 
is no reason why such interests should be analyzed 
differently simply because an interested party is involved in a 
bankruptcy proceeding.126 
                                                 
121 Id. 
122 Id. at 833. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. at 832. 
125 440 U.S. 48 (1979). 
126 Id. at 55 (emphasis added). 
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The Court went on to note that the justifications for applying state 
law were not limited to ownership interests.127 Rather, the Court 
expanded the application to security interests as well.128 The Seventh 
Circuit interpreted this language to mean that unless there is a 
provision in the Bankruptcy Code that says otherwise, state law 
governs the parties’ rights under a contract.129 Prior to the enactment 
of the BAPCPA, there was a provision in the Code—§ 506— that 
provided otherwise.130 There is no dispute. There also is no 
disagreement that this provision still exists with respect to non-910 
creditors. However, as the majority courts so steadfastly maintain, the 
BAPCPA expressly prohibits the application of § 506 to the claims of 
910 creditors. Consequently, as the majority courts argue, there is no 
applicable bankruptcy provision that applies with respect to the 
bifurcation of a 910 creditor’s claim.131 Applying the Supreme Court’s 
holding in Butner, state law applies.132 As the Seventh Circuit held, in 
the case where parties have contracted for particular rights, they are 
entitled to those rights.133 
The Seventh Circuit’s approach is also consistent with Article 9 of 
the U.C.C. The purpose of Article 9 of the U.C.C. is “to provide a 
simple and unified structure within which the immense variety of 
present-day secured financing transactions can go forward with less 
cost and with greater certainty.”134 It provides parties with recourse so 
that they will freely contract with others, which is crucial in our 
market-driven economy. The Seventh Circuit recognized the 
importance of the parties’ contract; namely, that the debtors explicitly 
agreed to be responsible for any deficiency.135 And the courts’ holding 
resulted in the parties’ actual contract having meaning—legal 
                                                 
127 Id. 
128 Id.  
129 In re Wright, 492 F.3d at 832. 
130 In re Ezell, 338 B.R. 330, 338 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2006). 
131 In re Duke, 345 B.R. 806, 809 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 2006).  
132 440 U.S. 48 at 48 (1979). 
133 In re Wright, 492 F.3d at 832. 
134 UCC 9-101 cmt. 
135 In re Wright, 492 F.3d at 832. 
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meaning—rather than simply being a means by which the debtors 
were able to get what they wanted, to the detriment of the creditor.136  
To adopt the majority’s view would obviate the need to contract 
because parties would not be held to them. This would further have the 
adverse effect of striking a serious blow to the effectiveness of Article 
9 and precluding parties from relying on the security interests. 
 
B. The Reason for the BAPCPA 
 
One of the factors that led to the enactment of the BAPCPA was 
abuse of the bankruptcy system.137  As discussed earlier, the enactment 
of the BAPCPA resulted in a provision applicable only to those debtors 
acquiring a vehicle shortly before filing bankruptcy. By singling out 
these debtors, Congress was seemingly concerned about their potential 
for abuse. It hardly seems rational that Congress would enact a 
provision targeting a potentially abusive debtor which afforded the 
debtor more opportunity to abuse the system after the enactment of the 
statute than the debtor had prior to. The Seventh Circuit’s 
interpretation is in harmony with this reasoning. Adoption of the 
majority courts’ reasoning would have an outcome that Congress 
surely could not have intended.  
Further, while the BAPCPA’s legislative history is dearth, the title 
of the section that enacted the BAPCPA clearly indicates that it was 
enacted to protect secured creditors.138 While one majority court was 
not convinced that its holding was “adverse to the position of a 
secured creditor,”139 under the reasoning of the majority courts, 
secured creditors will be denied that to which they are entitled—that to 
which they lawfully contracted for. If the amount of litigation brought 
by secured creditors with respect to this issue is not conclusive proof 
of the secured creditors’ belief that the majority courts’ holdings are 
“adverse” to their interests, surely it at least must be extremely 
                                                 
136 Id. 
137 See source cited supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
138 In re Zehrung, 351 B.R. 675, 678 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 2006); In re Wright, 
492 F.3d at 832. 
139 In re Quick, 360 B.R. 722, 728 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 2007). 
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persuasive. In In re Wright, the Seventh Circuit did protect the secured 
creditor, consistent with the purpose of the BAPCPA, by affording 




While the language of the BAPCPA is clear, the interpretation 
given to it by the majority courts is not only contrary to its plain 
meaning but also to Congress’s motivations behind enacting the 
legislation. A major factor underlying the need for the statute was to 
protect secured creditors. However, under the majority court’s 
interpretation, secured creditors are in a worse position following the 
enactment of the statute than they were before the legislation. It is 
hardly affording the secured creditor greater protection when you take 
away its entitlement to an unsecured claim—a right that it had 
previously enjoyed. Further, these contracted rights represent the very 
foundation upon which Article 9 of the U.C.C. is built. Depriving 
secured creditors of them while entitling unsecured creditors to these 
rights renders Article 9 a nullity and fails to pass “logical muster.”141 
In In re Wright, the Seventh Circuit adopted the correct interpretation. 
And by holding the 910 debtors to their original contractual 
obligations, the court’s holding is consistent with the plain meaning of 
the statute, Congress’s purpose for enacting the statute, and Article 9.  
Though the debate continues with little possibility of subsiding 
soon, it is clear that in courts adopting the majority view, 910 debtors 
will continue to have the opportunity to abuse the bankruptcy system 
to the detriment of 910 creditors—exactly what the BAPCPA was 
intended to prevent. As such, it is imperative that the majority courts 
adopt the view to which the Seventh Circuit subscribes. It is then that 
secured creditors will be given the protection that they expect, the 
protection that Congress desired them to have, and the protection that 
they have contracted for. 
                                                 
140 492 F.3d at 832. 
141 In re Quick, 360 B.R. 722, 728 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 2007). 
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